Gossip based communication is an efficient tool to manage unstructured decentralized Peer-to-Peer (P2P) overlay connectivity. Such unstructured overlay connectivity is prone to security risks. Few malicious nodes are able to isolate all peer of the entire overlay as in Hub attack. Several existing security protocols such as SPSS, TooLate, and S-Gossip have dealt with this Hub attack. A probabilistic gossip-based secure protocol is introduced to handle this attack efficiently. It senses faulty neighbours before gossip with high probability. It uses a single control table to seize the malicious nodes. The comparison shows that the effects of the proposed security protocol are better than others.
Introduction
The growth of the Internet in terms of size, services and speed indicates the changes from traditional client-server model to P2P model. In client-server model, clients can only request services and server can provide the response of the client requests. If server fails then whole system will be down. It indicates a single point of failure. To overcome such problems, distributed P2P architecture has been proposed. In this architecture, each peer (or node) seems as a server and communicate without participating of any central server. This architecture implements an abstract logical overlay over application layer.
Peer-to-Peer system categorized into two types: Structured and Unstructured. Structured P2P has fixed overlay network topology such as ring and hypercube. Distributed Hash Table (DHT) is responsible to construct such well-structured overlay and is support to perform an exhaustive and exact search 1 . Unlike Structured P2P, Unstructured P2P does not have any structure. Gossip-based protocols 2, 3 have come as popular paradigm for pure unstructured P2P systems. It forms a dynamic structure and follows small world network. Gossip-based protocols can easily construct such dynamic structure with the help of few neighbors 4, 5 . These few neighbors refer as view of a node. This view is updated with the help of gossiping peers at each gossip. This small set of view provides the vision of entire overlay 9, 10 . The vision of a peer will be deemed if the view set reduces its size. The reduction of a view may naturally (by churn) or forceful (by malicious peers). Natural reduction of view can be handled by gossip protocols efficiently. It shows that it can maintain the connectivity even after at a time 70\% peers left the overlay 6, 7, 8 . On the other hand, the protocol cannot suffer few malicious nodes. These malicious nodes can enter to show a new update for good nodes. The malicious nodes will leave the overlay after polluting the entire view of each node. It isolates all peers and described in Hub attack 12 . Hence, security while gossip is a major issue in unstructured P2P overlays.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is presented in Section II. Section III presents the proposed secure probabilistic gossip-based mechanism. Its comparative security results are presented in Section IV. Finally, in Section V we present the concluding remarks.
Related Work
To reduce the effect of Hub attack, some security protocols such as SPSS 11 , TooLate 12 and S-Gossip 13 have come into picture. SPSS focuses that a high in-degree node is more likely to become a hub, so malicious. The central authority keeps on watching every nodes, determines threshold and compare to maintain lists, namely, (i) blacklist, and (ii) whitelist. Higher in-degree nodes than threshold are maintained in blacklist whereas others in whitelist. Gossiping is ensured between two peers under the supervision of central authority. There is high probability that the malicious nodes can pollute the cache or view before determining whether it is affected peer or unaffected and central authority may be failed. Therefore, SPSS cannot provide integrated security feature so to overcome this issue, TooLate came into existence. TooLate as being completely decentralized can tightly handle blacklist with the base gossip protocol.
There are some other research works such as Uniform and Ergodic Sampling 14 and Brahms 15 are also mentioned about the effects of malicious nodes. Recently, S-Gossip has come into existence to reduce the effect of Hub attack with elimination of multiple instances of TooLate protocol. In S-Gossip protocol, Every peers has three tables namely Genuine Table, Suspicious Table and Malicious Table which creates three level of filtering of peers to ban or prevent malicious peers to include with non-affected peers, Malicious nodes are identified by using trust information by each peers about other peers and restricted them. This is more efficient than TooLate from the view point of security.
It is single instance protocol unlike TooLate protocol. There is no central authority as in SPSS. For capturing malicious nodes, it uses three tables namely Genuine The propose research work is based on a probabilistic gossip-based protocol. The property of sensing malicious nodes, before gossip, makes it different from others. Other distinguishes properties are, (i) it has completely decentralize mechanism unlike SPSS, (ii) it reduces number of tables unlike multiple tables in TooLate and S-Gossip, (iii) it reduces communication overhead unlike multiple instances of TooLate.
Probabilistic Gossip-based Model
A robust epidemic gossip technique has been proposed to reduce the degree of communication overhead. It has managed by view table VTable and control table VTable. Both tables are used to detect and paralyze some malicious nodes at the optimum level at each node. Primarily, VTable is assigned for maintaining small set of neighbor peers list and CTable for preventing from malicious peers. VTable contains neighbors (or view) of a node as in traditional gossip protocols such as Cyclon, Newscast, etc. The table assigns a predefine length and refers as View Length. It means the table contains up to View Length neighbors. The nodes inside table maintains two descriptors, they are node ID and capacity distribution index (CDI). The CDI value is used to enhance peer exchange operation to perform gossiping between two peers.
The value is computed for each adjacent peer on the basis of neighbor's capacity and in-degree. In general, each peer prefers to connect a high capacity neighbors peer for better service. But, the availability of the service is also a challenging issue in gossip protocols. Hence, we consider in-degree of VTable peers while selecting a peer to gossip with. High in-degree peers are most probably suspected as malicious one. On the other hand, low in-degree indicates unavailability of services.
Therefore, we have taken a probabilistic approach to find out a most suitable candidate for gossip. Let probability P i of a node i is connected by a new incoming peer. The probability is directly proportional to its capacity and inversely proportional to its current in-degree in a non-linear manner controlled by α >0 and β >0.
Where:
η i = capacity of node i , k i = number of P2P connection that a node i has L(t)= the set of all live node in VTable.
The larger the value of CDI, the greater chance of that node to be connected in the network according to given network structure and condition by tuning the value of αand β. So the gossip network structure designed in such way that it is more resilient to peer dynamics and supports efficient search with the help of VTable.
Gossip Mechanism
This protocol as being semantic based, each peers contains some local information (e.g.,CDI) of its neighbour peers computed with the help of equation (1). The gossip initialises from a node, say P with decrementing TTL by one of each node entry in CTable. Maximum CDI valued node, say Q is selected from P's VTable for gossip. In this gossip, nodeP is called an initiator node and performs as active gossip. The following steps demonstrate the gossip process at initiator.
Active Gossip at node P:
Find CID (VTable.node i ). Decrement TTL value (CTable.node i ) by 1. Select a max CID value node, say Q. Select random (ViewLength/2)-1 nodes from VTable. Add own node id P with CID=0 to the selected list. Send the list to node Q. Receive a list from node Q.
Invoke VTable_update with the help of received list from node Q.
After receiving the peers from node P, node Q performs as a passive gossip. Unlike initiator, passive nodeQ does not send own node descriptor. It only sends up to (ViewLength/2) nodes from its VTable. The passive gossip process is described below.
Passive Gossip at node Q: Receive a node list from node P. Select random ViewLength/2 nodes from VTable Send to node P.
Invoke VTable_update with the help of received list from node P.
At the end, both nodes update their respective VTable with the received nodes. The updated VTables of both end are ensure that the connection link must be followed in reverse direction. Hence at each gossip, the connectivity among peers is always maintained.
View Table Update
View table ensures the overlay connectivity. Hence, it is essential to update the entries with latest peer set. The malicious entries are able to deem the vision of a peer. Therefore, the proposed probabilistic protocol updates and fills each VTable securely with its maximum strength. The update process occurs at two phases. First phase called front update, where peers are updated with the receiving peers from the gossiping node. The overall processes of this phase are mentioned in algorithm (1). The next phase of VTable update is started at the end of gossip and called back update. In this phase, the empty space of VTable is checked. If the size of (|VTable| <ViewLength) then it will check the CTable entries. If there is no entry inside CTable, then nothing can be done. It shows that the overlay is just created or the node is just joined. In such case, the mechanism waits some time and then checksCTable entries again. Those nodes have hit value less than (μ -σ) are eligible peer for coping from CTable to VTable. Other peers are treated as either suspicious or malicious; therefore these nodes cannot be copied inside VTable.
ControlTable Update
The control table CTable of each peer is updated while each gossip. The CTable has anode descriptor, which includes NodeId, hit and TTL value. The detection of malicious nodes is exercised by comparing the hit value of the peer with an assigned threshold. The threshold value is the summation of current updated mean µ and standard deviation σ of hit values present in the CTable. The µ and σ are computed from equation 1 and 2 respectively, where N is the size of control table.
The hit threshold is always (µ+σ) for malicious nodes and (µ-σ) for non-malicious nodes. Initially, the TTL values of each peer are set to the value of ViewLength. It decrements by one at each gossip. TTL value helps to reduced false +ve and false -ve for control CTable update process is summarized in algorithm2.Anodeispurged from CTable whenever its TTL value will become zero and its hit value less than (µ-σ). Those nodes have hit value more than (µ+σ) will be re-initializing its TTL value. This process tries to seize the more gossip tendency nodes inside the table and a way from gossip process for time being. For more convenient, the algorithm is illustrated with two tables. The table1 refers the entry and update conditions. A node is entered first time when the received node. Say n i , present in VTable but not in CTable. In this case, ni is first assigned its hit value equal to the present µ value of CTable. Next, if ni presents only in CTable, which reflects that the sender wants more gossip and tries to fill its own VTable entries to the receiver end. In such situation the proposed mechanism simply increments the ni's hit value. After some gossip, ni easily identifies as malicious when the hit value crossed (µ + σ). Otherwise ni treated as nonmalicious and will release when its TTL becomes 0. This process handles false -ve in our proposed gossip mechanism. Fresh entry of ni inside VTable indicates no action on CTable. Table 2 point outs the exit conditions of a node from control table. In any case, a node can exit if it spends up to ViewLength gossip. We assume that with high probability that a node can be identified malicious or non-malicious inside CTable with ViewLength. In this time duration, each node assigns an equal chance to be proved itself. Therefore, the proposed mechanism initialize TTL value with ViewLength. The TTL value of each node decrements by one at each gossip. When TTL of a node becomes zero in CTable, our mechanism will check its hit value. It arises two situation, one for malicious nodes (hit > µ + σ) and second for non-malicious (hit < µ -σ). Former situation re-initialize the TTL value while later exit the node from CTable. Re-initialization of TTL value gives an opportunity to reduce the false +ve of CTable entries. Removing the entries of CTable helps to make a reasonable growth, so that the threshold calculation at each gossip and other overheads will be minimized. 
INCREMENT HIT BY 1
Joining and Leaving of node
In the proposed mechanism, each new node selects introducer nodes upto ViewLength. Then, the node find CDI value for applying probability formula of equation 1. It selects max CDI value nodes as its introducer node. This introducer node sends peers from its VTable and update the receiving new node inside its VTable. Further, the normal gossip proceeds. In such gossip, the leaving process is not defined and referred as churn rate. It indicates the rate of node joining and leaving in a gossip cycle. Obviously, more churn rate gives unsuitability in network connectivity while fewer rates insure healthy connectivity among peers.
Results and Analysis
Results of the proposed Probabilistic gossip protocol are compared and analysed with the help of Peersim [16] simulator. We took S-Gossip and TooLate security protocols to compare our proposed protocol. SGossip is recent security protocols while TooLate security is popular one. For exact comparison, all security protocols are securing a well-known unsecured Cyclon [9] gossip protocol from Hub Attack. Our protocol beats then with good marginal difference, which is shown in figure 3 and figure 4 . Both simulations are performed in a large network size, which contains 1,000 nodes. The ViewLength is 20 throughout the simulation. We have introduced 2% malicious nodes at simulation cycle one. Although, the effects of malicious nodes are independent from its injection cycle. Both results are explained below. Figure 3 describes the affect of malicious nodes without taking churn into considering, i.e., the network is static. The affect is comparatively less of the proposed mechanism due to probabilistically acknowledgement property of malicious nodes to non-malicious nodes. The average malicious nodes inside ViTab or cache are reduced. Figure 4 introduces 1% churn rate in the simulation. It means that there are 10 out of 1,000 nodes are adding and removing at each simulation cycle. We show the security vulnerability of gossip protocols after protecting with the proposed mechanism from figure 5. The simulation did on 5,000 nodes with 0.4% malicious nodes and 10,000 with 0.2%. It shows few malicious nodes have performed same effect on long run. Hence, we cannot ignore tiny quantity of malicious nodes inside such overlay. The initial effects of malicious nodes on the overlay are depicted in figure 6 . The figure shows hype at boot time, since the nodes are isolated due to no connectivity among them. Each node connects at cycle-1 after gossip; hence no cluster occurs at this point of gossip. The effect of malicious nodes is shown from cycle-2. Due to proposed secure mechanism, the formation of clusters are reduced and come down near zero very soon. More malicious nodes are formed more clusters initially and take few more cycles to handle them. 
Conclusion
Gossip-based protocols are a state of the art technique for the crucial unstructured P2P overlay connectivity. Secure healthy connectivity is an important issue in such P2P networks. We have pointed out the security vulnerability of such over-lays. We have modified the mechanism by applying probabilistic gossip model. The proposed scheme is proved to be more secure than other existing protocols through Simulation.
